Augment and rene the questions regarding relevant micro economic factors. Identify other social-economic-cultural-political factors that most directly impact the aspiring small businesspersons decisions. Smith, ed. Institute of Peace, U. Chapter 3, Fact Finding, 73 Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, PKSOICapacity building is the latest concept being developed and used by agencies to address issues concerning establishment of functioning governments and societies. Broadly understood, the term describes the ability to identify and augment critical human capital that supports eective governing systems and methods.
But within the U. Oen, the tactical and operational nuances of an agencys capacity building initiatives are avored by these individual denitions. Within the security sector, threats range from internal, domestic issues generally considered police responsibilities to outside interventions and actors that are more properly a military responsibility; these threats require a spectrum of capacities to minimize and deter potential danger.
Specic expertise is required for security initiatives directed towards more local and citizen-oriented approaches. In many operational environments in which the US may become involved, there needs to be the ability to apply law and maintain order in addition to the ability to employ lethal force. Transitional Law Enforcement brings policing work to the fore and is a key bridge between military-led securing of conict situations and longer-term development of mecha nisms to enable a country to own and manage its own security and development.
ICITAP, with funding support from the State Depart ment and other agencies, places long-term, in-country senior law enforcement advisors to provide tailored rule of law de velopment assistance to civilian police, correctional systems, and border security forces abroad. Considering the role of TLE in stabilization, capacity building should be developed in terms of domestically-based, locallyfocused civilian functions to enforce the rule of law. If eective, the value of the capacity building eort should endure beyond the duration of the USG deployment.
In-house ExpertiseBuilding criminal justice and civilian police capacity is not a new concept, and the U. ICITAP is one of the most qualied capacity building actors in carrying out a broader mandate to establish the rule of law, specically in complex and dynamic environ ments. Historically, ICITAP has been successful in using its unique approach to capacity building in a myriad of operational en vironments and has been at the tip of the spear of every major post-conict mission since it was tapped to help create the new Panamanian police force in ICITAPs comprehensive ar ray of law enforcement expertise is on exhibit around the world, and spans from working on advanced information systems in Bosnia and Albania to assisting in the ongoing transformation of the Philippine National Police from a military to civilian model of policing.
ICITAP has helped build the correctional system in Iraq, manage the police academy in Kosovo, improve capabilities and compliance with international standards of foreign laboratories worldwide, and create marine patrol units in Indonesia and the Philippines. In post conflict areas, this tenuous relationship is often strained as police take on more aggressive actions to control threats. This can lead to greater public animosity against police forces. In a post conflict society, if police are going to be effective in gaining the trust and cooperation of the public, they must support the rights of citizens and not act solely as agents of the state.
ICITAP strives to incorporate principles of human rights, human dignity, and equal access to justice in host nation law enforcement institutions through its assistance programs. Carr Trevillian, ICITAP Director, notes that in most post-conict missions, sacricing a longer-term institutional development focus for solely short-term objectives risks sustainable outcomes. It also will likely result in ten oneyear programs.
ICITAPs approach in post-conict missions consists of two parallel tracks: 1 immediately standing up basic law enforcement [functions] and 2 initiating [long-term] institu tional development programs based on thorough assessments of the host nations [existing] capabilities. On average, ICITAPs senior law enforcement advisors have plus years of experience in domestic law enforcement and have served in numerous assignments as mentors abroad.
Ad visors guide local law enforcement personnel toward establish ing, oen for the rst time, their legitimacy and rapport with the population while simultaneously changing the culture of the institutions and populations they support. When we engage in criminal justice development in a postconict situation, we must recognize that the U. Government is entering into an enduring criminal justice partnership with the host nation, notes Trevillian. We are not coming in to tell them what to do. We must build it with them, if development is to be sustainable. From there, ICITAP provides expertise in sequencing and development strategies, and focuses resources to address these capacity issues in the context of the local culture and traditions.
If funding is provided, ICITAP deploys experienced law enforcement devel opment subject matter experts to mentor host nation law en forcement actors in how to shape these reforms; ultimately, the host nation decides how to pace and implement these reforms, typically with U. ICITAP is diligent in working with other agencies and donors to ensure that law enforcement development programs comple ment each other and contribute to the broader goal of transforming the security sector.
We must always ensure that our eorts eectively support the larger USG development mission, reinforces Trevillian. Fur ther, for rule of law development to be successful, our strategy must be to address the components of criminal justice reform in an integrated fashion. Ideally, ICITAP works with other agencies to develop and reform the entire criminal justice system and institution, not only to train individuals. ConclusionICITAPs approach to capacity building yields a number of in teresting lessons in developing a broader, interagency denition of the concept.
First, the program highlights the importance of considering all needs within a security sector, even those consid ered domestic or non-military responses, to determine capacity requirements and produce institutional change. Stabilization and reconstruction goals cannot be accomplished by only train ing individuals; instead, law enforcement can be developed and sustainable only if the institutions in which individuals work have the proper organizational structure and capacity.
Stabilizing societies understand and can recognize their needs but need assistance to learn and adapt the appropriate resources, techniques, and procedures to address their needs. Donor nation assistance can help clarify the issues, provide alternative ways to address them, help identify gaps in capacity and capability, and sometimes provide personnel to ll gaps in the short and medium term. It is ultimately the long-term commitment of the host nation that fullls security needs, and chances for success are greatly increased if donor na tions advise the host nation on how best to allocate resources to achieve goals.
Lastly, unstable or fragile societies must be able to maintain capacity even in the midst of conict or disaster. ICITAP accomplishes this mission through mentoring and training within pre-existing or legitimate institutions, an embedded approach to working with the host nation. Such a model is crucial to fully understand how and why capacity is built in countries recover ing from stress and conict. Institute of Peace, Marshals Service, and U. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Photo by Lonnie Tague for e Department of Justice pksoi.
- User account menu;
- Bestselling Series.
- Peace & stability operations journal!
- Civil Affairs - CIMIC Handbook.
- Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations?
- Global Warming and the Future of the Earth.
Aside from providing security and support to military capacity building, military contingents might also apply their diverse expertise towards building civilian capacity. BackgroundHaving violently annexed and occupied East Timor for 25 years, Indonesia maintained an authoritarian rule over the populace.
UNTAET administered the territory, ex ercised legislative and executive authority during the transition period and supported capacity-building for self-government. As a part of the CMA task, the JEG, on its own initiative, planned and provided vocational training on civil engineering for Timorese government ocials. Reecting its holistic approach to capacity building, the JGSDF had incorporated this training phase as part of its deployment preparation planning. Along with the idea of vocational training, various types of commercial engineering machinery were included in the JEGs equipment list during the force generation process with the intent of donating it to the Timorese government when the Japanese mission ended.
Eight Timorese trainees received certicates 18 pksoi. From the Host Nations perspective, civil engineering capability is probably the most essential factor for developing nations so as to maintain and improve hard infrastructure. East Timor was one of the least developed countries by any standards and had very little human capital in the area of civil engineering when it became independent.
Aer hundreds years as a Portuguese colony, followed by Indonesian tyrannical rule since , East Timor was truly a newborn state. Very few peo ple received an adequate education and more than half of entire population was still illiterate as of In addition, many died during decades of struggle for independence. Its geographic features underscored the criticality of a civil engineering capability. A small island country of approximately 5, square miles, it features an east-west mountain range with peaks above 3, yards and steep slopes leading down to the coastlines.
Consequently, many roads and bridges were frequently washed away or severely damaged every year, leaving many villages isolated for extended periods of time. From the international contributors perspective, the paramount task for military components in UN peacekeeping operations is to maintain and improve security, and the primary role of force engineers is to assure ground mobility for security forces.
However, peacekeepers are more than soldiers; they are diplo mats representing their own countries. If operationally permissible, peacekeepers should engage in activities that support their nations diplomacy. Japan believed that helping East Timor develop its human capital in a visible manner would enhance the perception of Japan not only in East Timor but also among the international community.
Donating heavy engineer equipment at the end of the mission also has benets for the troop contributing countries from operational and logistic perspective. Since engineer machinery is generally heavy and used in muddy sites, cleaning require ments to meet Japanese quarantine standards absorbs enormous time, space, and man-power. Cleaning preparations also require special assets like very sturdy pits and high-pressure water guns as well as a lot of water. When Japan deployed an engineer unit consisting of members to the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia nearly 10 years earlier, it took almost two months to redeploy due to preparation.
Most of the time and manpower were spent on washing vehicles. Had it reduced the amount of equipment for redeployment, the contingent could have dedicated more time and manpower towards peacekeeping tasks. Painting equipment also expends time and resources since it must be painted white for UN missions and then painted back to its original color aer redeployment. Given all this time and expense, deploying with commercial equipment and donating it at the end of the tour is more economical for a country like Japan. However, a caveat is worth noting. Donating equipment and goods to support post-conict countries can become a double edged sword for contributing countries.
Donated pieces of equipment are not always properly maintained and used prop erly by the host nation. Equipment could remain idle if the host nation does not possess the knowledge and skills for operations and upkeep. Donated equipment might even impede the peace process, creating discord among local stakeholders. Donations could cause distrust of local government as citizens secondguess their leaders decision about the ownership and distribu tion.
Preparation of trainers and translators required considerable time. Local sta interpreters translated the train ing instruction in Tetun, the language of East Timor. At this point, it is instructive to point out some practical obstacles faced by trainers. None of the instructors had experience teach ing foreign nationals, and none of the local interpreters had any Military Support to Civilian Capacity Building pksoi.
Subsequent contingents continued and rened the vocational training project. Accord ingly, the second contingent expanded training to local areas including the Oecussi enclave and added training on a greater variety of equipment. Teaching methods and work ethos were incorporated into the training so that trainees could become trainers for other Timorese. One was to develop maintenance mechan ics so that donated equipment would be well-maintained and properly utilized. A lot of eort went into producing satisfactory results.
Instructors and translators had a lot of diculty in attaining training goals. Language bar riers required much time for preparation. Since trainees varied in learning skills and work experience, extra training was oered to less capable students to help them achieve acceptable stan dards.
Instructors sometimes had to teach basic mathematics for accurate planning and surveying calculations. In order to hold value and appeal for trainees, some incentives were oered. Cer ticates were signed by both the contingent commander and the Timorese minister and regarded as ocial licenses. Stately inau guration and qualication ceremonies signied the importance of the training, underscored by the attendance of high ocials from the Timorese government and the UNMISET, including the minister and the SRSG among others.
All together, the Japanese contingents conducted twelve courses and trained Timorese. Subsequently, at the request of the Timorese Government, a variety of engineer equipment and vehicles were donated as contingents scaled down and departed. At donation ceremonies, the course graduates drove and oper ated the highly prized equipment, a symbolic illustration of essential skills contributing to state building. It was quite unusual for an SRSG to call attention to the achievements of a specic unit out of all the other countries participating in the mission. Even though the JEG helped lay a solid foundation for civil engi neering in East Timor, continued support was still desired for further progress.
Most of the equipment donated by Japan was managed properly and kept in good condition. According to the JICA sta, except for some equipment lost to accidents in East Timors winding mountain roads, almost all of the equipment was still working as of early Conclusione eort to help build host nation capacity in East Timor is considered as one of the hallmarks of the JGSDF peacekeeping history.
Moreover, these types of operations underscore the value of interagency collaboration in support of state building. JGSDF assistance oered a way that promoted and encouraged reconstruction by the local communities rather than merely dispensing aid unilaterally. It is instructive to note that support of capacity building cannot succeed without trust between the support and the support edthe interplay between teaching and learning. A Timorese local laborer who worked with the JEG said, When we worked with the occupational military before the independence, guns were always pointed at us.
During the colonial era before that, the military never worked with us. But now we can work and eat together. I am very proud of showing my family my photo with my Japanese colleagues. Without earnest devotion, cre ativity, and mutual anity among those involved in vocational training, Japanese eorts in building host nation capacity would never have been successful. Fragile states pose a threat to the security of the U. Developing good governance and stability require long term commitments of resources.
It is a key end state in stability operations as well as counterinsurgency. Abandoning the eort to attain that benchmark means criminal violence increases, bribes inate the costs of goods, medicines do not reach hospitals, the people are exploited, and political opponents are attacked or imprisoned.
Army soldier at the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, Aug.
DoD photo by U. Air Force Master Sgt. Adam M. Stump PAGE 25 pksoi. As the U. Eorts to improve the care provided to detainees or prisoners fall even lower. Fragile state prisons have critical shortages of physicians, medical supplies and in some cases medical care all together. It may save lives and prevent disease miles and months distant from prison.
In Russia overcrowded prisons have bred new drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis that have proliferated virulently among the general public. Treating humans with dignity and respect is a common language of rec onciliation. Former UN Secretary General Ko Annan noted that to avoid a return to conict while laying a solid founda tion for development, emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such as demonstrating respect for human rights.
First, the majority of those incarcerated in fragile state prisons have never been convicted of any crime and their length of detention can last years as ineective and under-resourced judiciaries move slowly through their backlogs. In Zimba bwe, trained, experienced prison ocers have le the service in the thousands. Ocers are oen not paid enough to feed themselves attendance at work is erratic and prison supplies are stolen.
Doctrine and the LawU. Code currently presents an obstacle to an increase in military involvement in prison medical support. In recognition of the current inhumane conditions in many countries that receive U. ConclusionsAer ten years of conict in Iraq and Afghanistan the U. Military Healthcare System MHS providers now have exten sive experience in caring for detained populations and are well prepared to assist in medical support to fragile states prisons.
Although the daily practice of medicine varies greatly from the developed to underdeveloped world, the principles of preven tion, diagnosis and treatment in a relationship of dignity and respect do not. As the MHS develops strategies to support stability operations, health support of Rule of Law eorts must be considered on par with the historic approaches.
Providing training and aid for fragile states prison health care directly supports this eort. Agency for International Develop ment, January , 3. Department of the Army, December , D Secretariat, Department of Peace keeping Operations, January , Wash ington, D. C: e World Justice Project, , 1.
Police in Peace and Stability Operations, 8. Unfortunately, many of these communities are also suering from protracted internal conict which impedes the NGO communitys ability to respond. Work has been done to identify the major impacts conict has on public health and mechanisms to measure it. Unfortunately, there has been no strategic goal established for engagements and many well meaning projects have not led to capacity development or long-term reduction in human suering. Given the current political climate pervasive throughout the world, we need to look at unifying military and civilian humanitarian eorts if we are to succeed in mitigating the disease and suering in nations ripe with conict.
As dened by World Health Organization WHO the keys for tracking general health indicators that we need to look at are similar for peaceful and conict regions of the world. On top of these key health indicators, conict zones show greater disproportionate suering among women and children. Com pounding the issue in conict regions is lack of access to health care services. Hospitals and clinics oen become targets of op portunity for conict suicide bombings, staging locations for armed conict that deters the general populace from seeking care.
Conict-stricken countries have seen several instances of declining immunization rates as families are unable or unwill ing to take their children to get immunized for fear of becom ing victims of violence. Source: Murray, et. Lack of funding for health leads to increased disease burden due to lack of public health educa tional eorts.
See Figure 2 below for a conceptual diagram of the indirect eects of conict on public health infrastructure and overall impact on health. Conict has also been linked to signicant psychological trauma. Children especially become victims of psychological trauma, oen witnessing rape, torture or death. If le untreated this can have signicant long-term negative impact on their health status. Development of multidisciplinary treatment ap proaches is vital to help address the trauma and help children become productive members of society.
We provide analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace around the world.
Descriptive EpidemiologyCharacteristics of Persons ere are specic populations that are at most risk for negative health impacts related to conict. Unfortunately, these regions also have the least developed health infrastructures and populations in these regions are most vulnerable to the negative eects conict has on public health. Most violent conict tends to have a majority ethnic group targeting a minor ity ethnic group. Dierences of religion have also fueled many conicts, but the vast majority of conicts have centered around ownership or access to a valuable but limited resource.
Age ose persons at extremes in age are at increased risk to suffer the negative health outcomes associated with conict. Finally, when food resources are rationed, the elderly and children oen get inadequate proportions to ensure the 18 to 30 year olds that provide security remain healthy.
Socioeconomic status Fuerst et al. Conversely, they may be at greater risk for targeting related to internal violence. Inuential people in the community are prime targets for kidnappings and assassinations which puts them at risk from that perspective. Major Risk Factors Linking conict with public health outcomes can be tricky. To achieve this goal, focusing on measures of health from the World Development Indicators WDI would be most ap propriate, as this would ensure eorts are linked into the larger WHO millennium development strategies.
With this in mind, risk factors and health implications that can be derived from these indica tors are addressed in the following sections. Disruption of food, water and sanitation Public services, such as water, sanitation and food supply chains, can be disrupted during periods of protracted conict. Mak ing matters worse, electrical supply to households also becomes disrupted for extensive periods of time. Simulta neously, water and waste treatment facilities are also dependent on electricity and plumbing; disruption leads to signicant risk for water borne disease outbreaks.
Fuerst et al. Insurgent activity trying to disrupt the government will also target health care facilities and workers for violent actions. Conict will also increase the number of check points and impassable roads which make access much harder. Projects under tile Ministry. Support to microfinance DEA. Main Functions:. To provide an independent objective assurance and advisory services on governance, risk management and control processes through disciplined approach bymeasuring and evaluating internal controls.
To review and report on proper control over receipt, custody and utilization of all financial resources. Conformity with financial and operational procedures as defined by the Act and Accountant General for incurring obligations and authorizing payments andensuring effective control over expenditure. Correct classification and allocation of revenue expenditure accounts. Reliability and integrity of financial and operating data so that information provided allows for the preparation of accurate financial statements and other reports as required by legislation.
The systems in place used to satisfaction safeguard Assets and as appropriate verification of existence of such Assets. Operations or programs to ascertain whether results are consistent with established objectives and goals. The adequacy of action by management in response to internal audit reports, and assisting management in the implementation of recommendations made those reports and also, where appropriate recommendations made by the Auditor General. To carryout performance, forensic, quality assurance and IT audits to ensure all round provision of internal audit services and value for money.
The Directorate consists of three 3 departments. Information Technology and Performance Audit Department. The role of this department is to conduct an assessment of the use and generation of IT especially used in the preparation of financial statements and use of IT in the overall security and control environment in all Government entities.
Review and report on IT systems that generate financial statements. Review and report on the Integrity of information generated by the IT systems and advise management accordingly. Advise management an acquisition, use and maintenance of IT systems in Government entities. Review arid report on scalability of the existing IT systems.
Review and report on actual and potential security threats affecting the IT system. Forensic and Risk Advisory Department. The main role of this department is to develop the risk management framework for government and provide advisory services and carry out forensic audits in Government entities. Develop risk registers across all Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies.
Develop a risk management framework. Develop expert knowledge and skills. Improve Governance structures. Internal Audit department. The main role of this department is to appraise and report on the overall internal controls in all Ministries, Departments and Agencies and advise management on improving such controls. Review report on systems generating financial information and data. Conduct systems audit to ascertain whether or not internal controls are appropriate to the entity. Conduct value for money audits. Conduct risk management audits to ascertain whether or not management has set procedures for risk identification and management including frauds and money laundering.
Conduct environmental audits. Conduct reviews on various projects implemented by the entity. The Directorate is mandated to coordinate budget preparations for MDAs. The Directorate consists of four departments. Public Administration Department. Analyzing policies and programmes to advise on resource allocation. Prepare periodic reports on budget performance and, advise on policy options. Undertake Preparation and Analysis of Annual and 'Medium Term plans and budgets and advice on budgets.
Appraise projects of' the sectors under the department to ensure conformity to the National Development Plan. Monitor, analyze and evaluate Sector budget performance. Analyze budget performance of MDAs, their cash requests on quarterly basis in order to inform. Give periodic technical advice to ministries on budget and expenditure issues. Coordinate short and long term budgeting and implementation of the national budget in consultation with the government sector ministries and agencies that fall under PAD. Provide financial resources to sectors to enable them implement activities within their jurisdiction and in line with their mandate.
Undertake financial and physical monitoring to ensure efficient and affective resource utilization by sector ministries and agencies. Advice on the annual planning, budget preparation and execution process. Budget Policy Evaluation Department. The department is mandated to coordinate and prepare annual budget for Central Government transfers to Local Governments.
Main function. Analysis, coordination and preparation of annual budget for Central and Local Government. Analysis and coordination of quarterly releases to Central and Local Government. Initiate appropriate instrument for budget execution, monitoring and reporting. Develop, implement and oversee the financial and program monitoring in Local Governments. Initiate the review, evaluation, analysis of policies and strategies on budget related issues, to Local Governments. Undertake, Budget monitoring and accountability of all transfers to Central and Local Government.
Under this department, it is proposed that a Database Support Section for the Output Budgeting Tool OBT be created and additional Economists to support its functions in light of the increase in the number of Local Government and performance reports submitted by them. Infrastructure and Social Service Department.
Main functions:. Coordination of short and long term planning, budgeting and implementation of national Budget in consultation with the sector MDAs. Mobilize and provide financial resources to sectors to enable them implement activities in line with their mandates. Undertake financial and physical monitoring on the efficient and effective utilization of resources by sector MDDAs. Advise on the allocation of financial resources to MDAs. To coordinate the annual planning and budget preparation processes. Analyze sector policies and ensure that they are incorporated in the entire policy frameworks of Government.
Project Analysis and PPPs department. The mandate of this department is to analyze, appraise, monitor and evaluate all the development projects and facilitate the implementation of PPP initiatives to ensure sustainable economic growth and development. Formulate, review and co-ordinate policies, laws and regulations to improve project planning and management across Government. Analyze and appraise all proposed Government projects for approval. Develop and implement a monitoring and evaluation framework for all Government projects.
The main functional activities of the department are categorized in the detail below:. Project Identification and Origin. Ensure that the projects identified are consistent with the debt, strategy, fiscal framework and budget strategy and National Development Plan NDP objectives. Ensure that all new project proposals have been discussed and approved by the relevant Sector Working Groups. Study and review project proposals to ascertain alignment with strategic objectives as laid out in national and sector planning documents with a view to ensure consistency.
Identify specific issues for consideration in the feasibility studies for all new project proposals. Ensure that the project profiles are prepared in a format prescribed by the Development Committee for ease of analysis and review. Ensure that project briefs include all relevant information such as Technical viability, Financial sustainability, Economic viability, Environmental acceptability, Institutional sustainability, Relevance to poverty eradication objectives, decentralization objectives for projects implemented at the Local government level, and acceptable levels of risk and uncertainty.
Project Appraisal. Undertake financial and economic cost benefit analysis, risk and Uncertainty Analysis and Sensitivity Analysis. Review projects to ensure their resource allocation is consistent with macroeconomic targets. Review project expenditures to ascertain clear prioritization and linkage to the strategic priorities of the NDP and in accordance with to the Social and Economic Returns in terms of income or dimensions of the quality of life.
Prepare and maintain a viable Project Pipeline Database for implementation in the short medium and long term and regularly report on its evolution. Project Monitoring and Evaluation. Review all on-going projects and identify projects to exit the Public Investment Plan and those that are recurrent in nature. Recommend the transfer the funds to the recurrent budget or re- allocate the funds to other relevant activities in the Sector.
PPP Unit. Pre p are Draft Regulations for-the PPP process and institutional roles and responsibilities; including prescribing rules for managing the PPP process procurement strategy and procedures, marketing, and PPP contract management. Appraise PPP Projects for commercial and economic viability and value for money, and the attendant direct fiscal implications of PPP projects. Design PPP project Contracts, performance requirements, payment and adjustment mechanisms and dispute resolution and termination.
Maintain economic stability through designing and implementing prudent macroeconomic policies. Mobilize domestic revenue by designing appropriate tax and non-tax revenue policies. Design and coordinate economic and financial policies for regional and international cooperation. Generate evidence-based analysis to guide the formulation of economic development policy. Develop policies and strategies to promote private sector competitiveness and growth. Design policies and strategies to ensure and 'promote financial sector development.
Design policies. Macro-Economic Policy Department. Formulation and coordination appropriate fiscal and monetary policies for purposes of maintaining economic stability in consultation with Bank of Uganda. Develop and maintain a consistent framework to support macroeconomic programming and macroeconomic policy formulation. Develop and maintain appropriate tools to support macro-economic policy analysis. Develop and maintain appropriate fiscal framework to enforce within year fiscal discipline.
Coordinate the production of appropriate statistics to support fiscal policy management. Monitor and advice on appropriate external sector policies. Coordinate negotiations with IMF on appropriate economic and financial policies. The Department consists of four 4 major sections. Fiscal Policy Management and Statistics Section. This Section is responsible for:. Supervising the compilation of Government Finance Statistics.
Coordinating the activities of the Ministry's statistics committee. Producing reports on aggregate fiscal performance. Coordinating surveillance by the International Monetary Fund. Real Sector and Economic Analysis Section. This section will be mainly responsible for maintaining the macroeconomic framework to support medium term budget and macroeconomic programming. Develop and maintain an appropriate data-base to support medium term macroeconomic programming and forecasting. Monitor real sector developments to support forecasting economic growth rates.
Develop and maintain a data-base on monthly and annual basis containing key economic indicators to: monitor economic performance. Producing monthly, quarterly and annual economic performance reports. Undertake periodic macroeconomic policy analysis.
Guidebook for supporting economic development in stability operations
Monitor oil sector developments,. Monitor performance of regional economies against the EAC macroeconomic convergence criteria. External and Financial Section. This section is responsible for overall coordination of external and financial sector policies formulation and monitoring. Macroeconomic Modeling Section. This Section will be responsible for developing and use of economic models to support economic management. The cost functions will include:. The Develop and maintain economic models to support, macroeconomic management. Maintain a comprehensive macroeconomic database to support, economic modeling and analysis.
Undertake research and analysis to support economic management and policy advice. Tax Policy Department. The Department is composed of four 4 Sections namely;. Domestic Taxes. The section includes direct taxes income taxes and indirect taxes consumption taxes - VAT and Excise Duties. Trade Taxes. The section will carry out negotiations and make recommendations with the regional trading blocs, policy and revenue' analysis of the international trade taxes. It will' also handle Petroleum duties, excise duty on imports, environmental levy on imported goods, import duty, VAT on imports, tax exemption on imported goods, Temporary road license and levy on hides and skins.
Tax Analysis and Forecasting. This section deals with data collection and analysis, building data base, research on topical tax issues, tax policy analysis, and revenue forecasting, building tax revenue forecasting models on all taxes, proposing tax policy changes and advising on the implications tax policy changes on revenue.
It will also be responsible for formulating, monitoring, analyzing and advising on appropriate policies on Non-Tax Revenue fees and licenses, fines, registration fees, user fees, permits, revenue from the sale of government assets among others. The Department is expected to consolidate and improve NTR collections to supplement tax revenue collections. This will improve on tax revenue effort and reduce the financing gap. Natural Resource Taxation Section. It will be. In particular, the Division will be responsible for;.
Formulating a Natural Resource fiscal regime. Participating in formulation of policy and legislation. Formulating appropriate Natural Resource revenue management policies. Participate in Advisory Committee meetings. Build models for forecasting natural Resource revenues. Monitor Natural Resource revenue assessment and collection. Provide principles, rules and 'regulations for taxation of the petroleum sector. Report performance of the natural resource fiscal regime. The Division is important for designing natural resource taxation and capacity building which is one of the long term benefits of exhaustible natural resources.
Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation Department. To analyze the allocation of external resources t6 support development priorities stipulated in the National Development Plan. To coordinate Regional and International cooperation for effective Government participation in regional events and harnessing the benefits for Ugandans. To act as the first focal point of contact for Development Partners, and strengthen the coordination of regional consultative meetings between the government and Development partners.
Scrutinize and provide advice on all grant agreements including protocols and follow-up on their implementation. Advise on external resource identification, allocation, development Assistance Policy and Procedures relating to grants including Technical Assistance. Review regional corporation agreements and protocols to ensure they incorporate provisions that benefit Ugandans.
There are three 3 major sections in this department namely;. Bilateral Cooperation. This section is responsible for mobilizing resources, technical and cooperative grant arrangements from Bilateral Development Partners and regional initiatives, preparation of briefs and reports on bilateral grant procedures and processes of Development support and regional integration.
- Material Information.
- Wind Loading of Structures, Second Edition.
- Herbal Simples Approved for Modern Uses of Cure (2nd Edition).
- The Centrosome in Cell Replication and Early Development.
- Devices of the Soul: Battling for Our Selves in an Age of Machines (1st Edition)?
But this is very difficult; it is very hard to reliably diagnose decades old conflicts. It is a long-term approach - and the US always has a hard time devoting sufficient time to operations in such places. But to the credit of commanders in Afghanistan there were instances where time was invested in order to develop a true understanding of the local situation. What was usually found was a mix of marginalized tribes being cut out of economic sources of power as well as other formal or informal sources of power. It was really a matter of trying to find a power sharing solution to conflict.
This formula is very promising but it is time consuming and requires some skill-sets that may not be readily available. I also think it is very important to look at this formula as one that requires a partnership with other entities or individuals that have the necessary expertise. It is wrong to expect special operators to learn everything or acquire all required skills.
The special operators relearned the art of sitting with the elders to figure out the complicated web of rivalries, to understand the alliances between the individual villages, but also understanding how the villagers could be motivated to come together for a common purpose. SWJ: You have emphasized that one important innovation at the core of projecting the VSO on a larger scale was the partnership developed between the SOF community and conventional infantry forces. Linda Robinson: This is critically important given the small size of special operation forces.
If one expects the US defense strategy to be implemented in order to build partner capacity around the world one has to realize the task is far beyond special ops capacity to do alone. An interesting experiment undertaken in Afghanistan was to assign two infantry battalions to the Special Ops Command and divide these infantry battalions to send a squad to each of 52 special ops teams that were spread across the country - and thus building a force multiplier by providing teams force protection and, in some cases, enlisting the squads in the core tasks of stability operations and building the local police.
In order for this to be applied successfully several things need to happen as the Army is very reluctant to have specialized forces and this is the nub of the problem. Today to be the most effective at this kind of activity, units need to have repeat tours in the same place. Similarly, at an individual level, allowing some to specialize in a particular region would provide a leadership cadre for young soldiers sent out to do these tasks in conjunction with special ops.
The final point that I would make is the importance of building a system that allows sufficient time to prepare. I think this is a model for what needs to be done and I hope that there will be enough funding for these types of programs; but more importantly, a bureaucratic mindset to support such efforts must be institutionalized, an understanding that this is how you enable success. SWJ: Responding to an insurgency requires more than just a military component, a comprehensive approach is necessary.
Should partnerships go beyond SOF and conventional forces, bringing in development, governance, and other experts? To some extent this is going back to what I saw in Central America in the s - where it was routine to have those elements as part of a partnership. It was much easier ironically for civilians to get out then than it is now. Today regional security officers restrict to an incredibly degree the ability of civilians assigned to embassy country teams to get out in the field in risky situations to work with special ops or any indigenous element.
I think this reluctance is even greater now after the Benghazi incident. SWJ: What kind of a mindset, at the individual and institutional levels, is required in order to operate effectively and be able understand and craft an answer to political-military challenges? Linda Robinson: On the military side, I think there is a need to ensure recruiting literature and the recruiting pitch includes and appeals to those with an interest in the world out there - working and living in other cultures. On the civilian side there is a whole group of Foreign Service officers appointed as foreign policy advisers for the military commands, a program that was massively expanded over the past decade.
I think the Foreign Service promotion system should really reward those who have an interagency mindset - those who are working best with other elements of the US government. The system should reward and require a tour in another agency because it provides powerful friendships, relationships and the knowledge of how another bureaucracy operates. Somewhere we got lost in talking about all the other agencies. We must get the three Ds Defense, Diplomacy and Development, lashed up and make use of all these people that have been out there in the field whether it is in PRTs or whatever over the last decade.
We may not have any big wars going on, but if the US can get that talent and put them in these places in small teams and I think we will be very successful. It was also a localized approach, because this is a very difficult country to move around. They are not going to have a large air-mobile capability for quite a while simply because it is very hard to train Afghan pilots. A more appropriate model for Afghanistan going forward is a smaller overall force that is sustainable - but also a force that includes and is based more on local defense initiatives that can start replicating themselves.
We need to make sure they are being empowered with their own decision-making. Linda Robinson: This is very important because I found without exception that every special ops team I encountered directly referenced their experiences elsewhere and these were highly relevant. The two main groups that spent most of the time in Afghanistan were the 3 rd and 7 th Special Forces Groups. They had a lot of experience, 10 years now, in the Philippines.
But history shows that counterinsurgency is a state-centric process requiring developing and investing in a massive state-building component. In Colombia and Philippines we can talk about a successful low cost FID because behind the effort there were reasonable local institutional and administrative machineries.
Linda Robinson: You make a very good point and this is certainly the case with Colombia and the Philippines, although the state structures in the Colombian case absolutely did not reach out to the countryside. So the counterinsurgency effort led and formulated by Colombia has been very much one of projecting first state security and now state governance and fixing the economic disparity. Nascent is the operative word here. Additionally, we have to fix our counterinsurgency model so that we are focusing first and foremost on police.
On the other side, it takes a lot of time to build any state structure so what VSO was really leveraging in the first instance was the desire of local people to defend themselves and the key elements of the local setting - tribes, elders, those grass root informal structures. The goal of the VSO program was community mobilization, by helping villages identify and address the problems that were creating conflict and instability in their area.
This provides the formula to work while there is no sufficiently developed state structure and that model can be applied in places like Yemen heavily tribal where the government does not reach outside the city limits or Mali. SWJ: If the willingness of the local communities to mobilize against the Taliban was there why did it happen in and not earlier?
No one was standing at that time because no one was reaching out to help these people stand up. The countryside was pretty much on its own. That psychological benefit of having someone out there gave many of these leaders the courage to come forward. What it really took was a team being there that provided an umbrella of security.
SWJ: Do you see this model of working locally, with the grass root structures, as being sustainable when there is no broader institutional framework able to anchor these community defense initiatives? Linda Robinson: It depends fundamentally on the quality and the ability of the local leadership.
This is what I found in the microcosms that I focused on in the book. A strong, charismatic leadership able to use their tribal stature as a legitimizing force to galvanize villagers is going to be the key no matter what. If our pipeline of aid to Afghanistan stops after some local defense initiatives will continue as a purely voluntary effort because it is in their interest to guard their homes, families and farms.
I can see that happening at least in the couple of places that I focused on - Kunar and Paktika. Linda Robinson: For Afghanistan the most important determinant of success will be the US willingness to maintain a small but distributed presence. The emphasis is on distributed. If they are willing to have a distributed special operations presence, perhaps augmented by conventional forces, and continue this for some time, I think the country will make it through and it will move forward.
Ultimately, success really involves applying this model elsewhere. The special ops community is quite poised to apply all these four things that I have mentioned - using local forces, developing local SOF, using coalition SOF and combining these elements in a unified command.
These are the hallmarks of any operation conducted in other parts of the world. This is the vision that Admiral McRaven is driving toward. It is also one that has been embraced in part by the Administration, but the Administration also has voices that would prefer just stand-alone CT missions. This is a debate to have not only in policy circles but also in the public. At the same time, I am quite concerned about Americans becoming very isolationist and unwilling to do anything to help countries in areas where we do have vital interests and failing to understand that a small commitment over a period of time can have a great effect at a much lower cost than waiting until a problem or a threat is so severe that we need to intervene unilaterally at a great cost and size.
It is a problem of policy-makers driven by public opinion polls. The other problem is the US military may find it much easier to say that we can use a high tech approach to defeat the threat when in fact at the end of the day somebody has to be there on the ground knowing what is going on and probably helping those partners.
Do we have here a symbolic center of gravity shifting from the combat SOF to the task of empowering partners and becoming teachers? Linda Robinson: To teach, to facilitate, to listenall these verbs come in to play here. I was very impressed by the team leaders that seemed to grasp the skills that were required to work in a foreign culture with people many years older, able to gain their respect, but still in the end also prepared to teach them.
Often it will not be about overt teaching, but enabling and facilitating. Just as we underrate the teachers in our society this has been an underrated skill-set of the special operations forces. Their ability to do that rests on some internal institutional changes.
This is where the US Special Ops Command is trying to reorient to do, but it requires shifting bodies and money to this. I am waiting to see more bodies and money shifted. This causes the United States to work by, with and through often odious and oppressive regimes; to hold down such populations. This causes the United States to work by, with and through the populations to achieve its the United States' objectives. Based on recent experiences, we have learned, much to our chagrin, that many populations still do not want an American way of life and an American way of governance.
ÙØµÙ Ø§ÙÙ ÙØªØ¬
This has caused the United States to re-adopt its Cold War approaches and, thus, again work by, with and through the often oppressive and odious regimes to transform the populations, often against their will, more along modern western lines. All our current approaches Phase Zero Operations, small SOF footprint, by, with and through host-nation governments, building partner capacity, etc relate to actions undertake via the regime and that:.
Thus, and by our actions here, we officially declare as dead both 1 the idea of "universal values" and 2 the idea that because of universal values we might work by, with and through the populations to achieve our desired ends. Henceforth, and as in Cold War days, things will again be seen as having to be achieved against the will of the population and, thus, as it were, via uphill -- rather than downhill -- battles.
Since several of you said that Linda Robinson was placing an "equals sign" between VSO and the future of the American way of war: There is no such statement here, neither in the book the interview title says: "VSO and the future Great phrasing- since I think the key question is "what is the problem"? If one perceives the problem as "how do we establish a stable government" or "how do we defeat or assist in defeating an insurgency"- then I think that is very different than the definition of what the problem was by most I talked to who were involved in the planning back then:.
I think I'd just use the thinking of the "top strategists" that I talked to at that time heavily caveating that term- I'm referring to a few in the TSOC who laid out some facts, questions and assumptions prior to :. Facts: 1- That in the center of gravity of the Bush admin was Iraq 2- That there was no American support for a long-term occupation of Afghanistan 3- That it was questionable that a focus on the Taliban was more important than continued efforts in the region especially with respect to possible negative implications in Pakistan and AQ presence in Pakistan and the region.
Questions: 1- What are the U. Assumptions: 1- U. Conclusion: That in the long-term at that time it would most likely have been more in our interests to leave Afghanistan largely to NATO and the Afghans which would have meant mostly to the Afghans , concentrate on Iraq at that point , communicate our intent to come back in if needed to Afghanistan if entities in Afghanistan threatened the U.
At that point, admittedly, our options were heavily influenced by our actions in Iraq. Making Afghanistan -- or other outlying states and societies -- "more internally peaceful" is not our objective. Transforming these outlying states and societies -- more along modern western political, economic and social lines and, thereby, making them less-problematic and more useful -- this is our objective. A certain degree of conflict and resistance, coming mostly from conservative elements desirous of maintaining the status quo; this being more or less a "given" and a well-known "part and parcel" of these transformational processes.
An example: If by completely isolating themselves -- and outlawing international commerce and trade -- outlying states and societies could be made to be more internally peaceful we, absolutely and positively, would not allow this. In this endeavor, we accept that conflict, in one form or another, and to one degree or another is to be expected. Here in this pretty world, Gallantry took its last bow. Look for it only in books, for it is no more than a dream remembered, a Civilization gone with the wind.
This is what we hope to achieve in places such as Afghanistan and elsewhere where, much like the Old South, we find different ways of life, different ways of governance and different values, attitudes and beliefs which:. Thus the question becomes, can Village Stability Operations play an important role in causing the civilizations of these outlying states and societies to become, more or less, "gone with the wind? Could special forces from the American North -- operating in communities in the American South for significant periods of time before the American Civil War -- have had any meaningful effect on destroying the way of life, etc.
Could special forces from the American North, operating in communities in the American South over significant periods of time before the American Civil War, earlier, at less cost and before things got out of hand, have helped to ameliorate the underlying problems resident in the Antibellum South to wit: its way of life, its way of governance and its underlying values, attitudes and beliefs?
Herein, for consistency, let us say that the American North, during this lengthy period of its special forces deployments in the American South, would be acting, somewhat, via all its non-military instruments of power -- this, so as to more-peacefully bring about the state and societal transformation that it desired in the American South.
Interesting the comments on IEDs which in my eyes is just as much a failure as the term COIN issomehow we got into the term IED and off what for years they actually weremines, improvised mines, and booby trapsnothing more nothing less and yes even in VN they were just as effective as they were in Iraq and AFG. At the height of the Iraq violence there were as many as a week being exploded and or foundstatistically seen in Iraq every third patrol was getting hit on a daily basis. In AFG the insurgents simply increased the size and can virtually defeat any vehicle that we use there on a daily basis.
Would be interesting to understand why we do not discuss this failure as we discuss say the failure of COIN. Well, I do not have any "conventional definition of what is considered an appropriate military objective and domain" and I have no objections to what you are saying in terms of losing will to fight.
On the other hand - "strong central government" was one thing we self-restricted ourselves in. Instead of analyzing and coming up with the best governance system we came up with western model of society which in turn can bring us to the result you described. The thing I am questioning is the relevance of such political system in country like Afghanistan in order to achieve whatever goals might we have.
Got your points regarding the IEDs. However, you never can end up with only defending the areas. It does not have to work but it can contains more risk but if successful, can be much faster. The philosophy is that if they are emplacing the IEDs in your "supposedly controlled" areas, they will be emplacing them the same way in their areas because that way you are taking strategic initiative from them.
Is it going to have an influence on your logistic? Maybe not as much as one could think. Definitely it is worth of further analysis. Basically you take strategic initiative because they need to concentrate more on their areas and less on your areas which in turn can help controlling your areas with much less resources. Regarding the irregulars - the basic philosophy is that you are using the same type of forces which fight in a similar way and have similar capabilities with the insurgents consciously simplifying here. And as I said, if you chose a proper governance system, you do not even need strong central government with conventional military unless it is inherent to the country's mentality.
I am not mimicking the doctrine about popular support which is surely good to have but one way or the other, the insurgents are fighting for control over those people and since they stay for a long time, they need to have some voluntary or involuntary support people do not have to like them but the insurgents live of them - even the foreign fighters and over-the-border networks or cells. Now, from the counterinsurgent's perspective it is still better if they cannot access the populace than if they can regardless of how much support they have from abroad. Actually this was my argument with Robert C.
When I am talking about COIN, I am talking in terms of any actions to defeat the insurgency and resolve core grievances which is doctrinal definition, BTW being it C-H-B which I think is not , VSO, barbecuing, playing soccer or any actions which can contribute to cease the insurgency. I mean anything which is working in a specific situation. I agree with your last paragraph, however, what type of ANSF will be more sustainable and will bring more operational benefit?
There maybe comes into play more irregular approach, too. I already asked this question G Martin but can you tell me if you were the top strategist who successfully toppled the TB regime and now the insurgency is growing providing you are back in , how would you solve the problem from the scratch? Matt, if you want to argue doctrinal definitions of domains, then there is no human domain; however, I believe there is a human domain that is multi-dimensional, and one very key dimension is political opinion. It may not fit your conventional definition of what is considered an appropriate military objective and domain, but it fits theirs and what they taught us in SF decades ago.
It is actually quite simple, if our political leaders lose their will and are convinced to pull or greatly reduce support to Afghanistan it will permit the adversaries to focus their efforts on the Afghan security forces, and if they can defeat them the populace will follow the alpha dog. They have no requirement to win over the populace, simply to cow them into not supporting the government.
Next they pressure the security forces and gradually separate them from the state, at that point is a matter of weeks before the government falls. In the end all power comes from the barrel of gun according to Mao. I personally hate the SOB, but he is right when he implies that hard power wins over soft power every time if the two methods are competing in the same domain, and if one is willing to be as brutal as necessary. I think it is fair to say our adversaries are quite willing to be as brutal as necessary. All the nation building we did will be for naught if it unfolds this way.
Back to IEDs, my point is they serve as an indicator that we don't control the human or land domain. If we were implementing the VSO program using the oil spot strategy I know we never did, and never said we were, we had new clever ideas so we could ignore the old rules of war right? However, if we did use the oil spot strategy that means we would control all the domains human, land, air, maritime within the core of the oil spot the periphery would be contested , the fact that the adversary has considerable freedom of movement to employ IEDs on MSRs indicates we don't control squat.
I have been advocating for the military to get off the roads for years to include in Iraq , but at the end of the day we still need to deliver logistics via the road the Afghans can't sustain logistical support via air after we leave. Logistics are important in any form of conflict, even ones that are so called populace centric. We haven't done our military job very effectively, much less win over the populace. You said at the end of the day they want to dominate the human domain, which may be true, but they know to do that they have to defeat the government and its security forces.
This is an aspect of fighting irregulars we dismiss in our doctrine and of course authors like Linda perpetuate the myth that ODAs conducting VSO is the future way of American War. It is simply a supporting effort, and a supporting effort that will fail if we also forget to take the fight to the enemy in a decisive way. You repeatedly state that denying the population is only part of the overall effort, but my point is we're doing very little else to decisively defeat the adversaries. That isn't a dig on you, it is actually supportive of your point.
If we were executing a comprehensive strategy directed at defeating the adversary then the VSO would be much more effective. You are mimicking doctrine that insurgents need the support of the people to fight. The reality is that depends on the situation, and in Afghanistan Haqani, and other groups don't need the support of the people in Afghanistan to continue their fight. They get plenty of support from foreign supporters and population groups external to Afghanistan.
Where do we end up based on COIN doctrine? That is easy, right where we're at now and where Iraq is at now. We won't change anything at this point. What is my solution? We can't rewrite history, so my recommended approach is water under the bridge now. For now, I think downsizing is appropriate at this point, but I hope we provide ample support to the Afghan Security Forces to hold the line, yet to be seen if we will or they will. For us the lessons we draw from this conflict will be most important. I'm afraid we'll either blindly embrace nation building in the pursuit of modernism, or reject the human aspect of conflict completely in hopes of pursuing our ends through ISR and long range strikes.
What we need to learn are the basics, which first means gaining understanding of the situation and determining what is in our interests that we actually need to employ military force to achieve, and then appropriately scope the objectives. My description of IEDs is based on what the asymmetry is in this environment. You said that "you can't deliver logistics to some areas within the periphery via ground vehicles due to the IED threat", which implies perception of using IEDs to deny our FoM that is common perception on the ISAF side.
That is our way of thinking in terms of physical terrain and maneuver in terms of conventional forces. Political opinion is not decisive terrain. The terrain is something you operate in physical or abstract. You do not operate in political opinion, you can influence political opinion. In that case the terrain would be diplomatic field but only regarding their political LoE. At the end of the day, they want to dominate the human terrain to take over the power over it.
I don't know how many times I have said here that denying access to the population is only one of the means or conditions to defeat them, not the defeat itself. How is that belief giving them freedom of movement? They have it anyway, unless you deny them the access to the populace which they use as the base for their support , which is not their defeat but can lead to their defeat unless you want to defeat them by killing them all.
See the difference? Your description of I ED use is overly simplistic. I sure as beck didn't say anything about defensive I ED use. The decisive terrain for our adversaries at this time is political opinion in the West so they can isolate the gov from external support. They actually have a. Strategy and understand our that our belief we can defeat them by denying access to the local population gives them considerable freedom of movement to pursue their ends. When you build a strategy that is largely informed by flawed doctrine this is where you end up.